



Reliability, distributed consensus & bitcoin

COSC312 / COSC412

Learning objectives

- Consider **reliability** as a key part of computer security
- Encourage you to **always design for failure**
- Appreciate how **decentralised consensus** helps security aspects such as **reliability & non-repudiation**
- Gain an initial view of **blockchain approaches** and how they support bitcoin, and other emerging **decentralised autonomous systems**

Securing valid results on fallible machines

- Digital devices suffer **(non-malicious) failures**
 - RAM corruption errors—c.f., ECC memory
 - Storage media may **fade or malfunction**
 - Beware cheap writable optical media or flash storage
 - SSD devices fail very differently from magnetic hard drives...
- Also may have vulnerability to **critical software failures:**
 - filesystem bugs
 - compression library bugs
 - system use contrary to supported operation

One solution: rerun your computations

- If you can estimate the **probability of failures**, you can determine how many trials of a computation you need to **achieve a given level of confidence** in the result
 - Excessive system failures may become overshadowed by other concerns anyway...
- Of course multiple trials need not be run in serial:
 - can structure **repeatability within a software service**
 - cloud computing provides convenient **elasticity for parallelism**

Aside: machines designed to fail frequently

- Computers have **adjustable reliability**
 - Can trade off against speed, power consumption, *etc.*
 - Consider the practice of **overclocking CPUs**:
 - may need to apply CPU voltage adjustments;
 - may affect reliability of computation—possibly catastrophically!
- Computer participates in a group repeating results?
 - Can purposefully **design such a computer to be less reliable**
 - May end up with a net saving in this resource trade-off

Distributed consensus—trustworthy results

- Common in more than just storage systems, e.g.:
 - Primary/primary relational **database server replication**
 - NoSQL: e.g., use of gossip protocols and eventual consistency
 - Network infrastructure such as **routers with hot spares**
- Systems now exist that just handle **consensus gathering**
 - e.g., Apache ZooKeeper, etcd offer distributed synchronisation
 - **Apache ZooKeeper** used in other systems: Hadoop, HBase, ...
 - **etcd** used as main configuration database in Kubernetes

Apache ZooKeeper & etcd

- Essentially multi-server, **key-value database** systems
 - However, emphasis is on **correctness and synchronisation**
 - **ZooKeeper** introduced to Hadoop to address complex failures: coordinates & manages scheduling of map-reduce tasks
 - **etcd**, e.g., facilitates updating clusters without breaking them
- Key property: **facilitates atomic broadcast**
 - Under atomic broadcast all correct processes in a distributed system receive the **same sequence of events, or all abort**

Distributed consensus algorithms

- Fischer Lynch Paterson impossibility result (1985):
 - Consistency protocols pick 2 of: safety, liveness, fault tolerance
- **Paxos**: fault tolerant consensus over distributed nodes
 - Used widely, including within Apache ZooKeeper
- **Raft**: alternative to Paxos, used by etcd
 - Raft algorithm easier to understand and implement than Paxos
 - Sub-problem 1: leader election
 - Sub-problem 2: log (*i.e.*, data) replication by leader to followers
- **EPaxos**: more complex and efficient than Paxos

Add in potentially malicious parties

- ZooKeeper, etcd are used when **we trust all servers**: e.g., they are owned by one organisation
- When **malicious parties** may be participating, the consensus set size must grow
 - Need a majority of votes from the **assumed-benign** server set
- Could we choose **not to control the server set**?
 - Enter **permissionless blockchains**, e.g., bitcoin
 - Safety presumed if 50% of nodes are benign (isn't quite right!)

Different types of fault tolerance

- **Crash fault tolerance (CFT)**
 - Crash faults are what the name suggests: a node disappears
 - CFT usually tolerates $\frac{N}{2}$ failures within N distributed nodes
 - So a majority of nodes must agree
- **Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT)**
 - Byzantine faults include nodes acting maliciously
 - Malicious node may be actively trying to break a given protocol
 - BFT usually tolerates $\frac{N}{3}$ failures within N distributed nodes
- Raft & Paxos are only CFT; variants of Paxos are BFT

Warm up exercise: build a cryptocurrency

- How do we make a **cryptocurrency 'coin'**?
- How do we identify **coin owners**?
- How can we protect the system from **forgery**?
- How do we record ownership and **transfer of ownership**?

- Can copy digital assets perfectly, so how can coins be single-use?

Distributed consensus needs within bitcoin

- To work, currencies need to track **who** has **what**
 - Normal currency uses TTPs such as mint, banks, *etc.*
- bitcoin has all validating nodes store the **whole ledger**
 - Distributed ledger is **sequence of blocks** of transactions
 - Collectively agreeing transaction order **avoids double-spending**
- A **wallet** is a hash of a public key a client generates
 - Own private key? Can prove your connection to transactions
 - ... don't actually need a representation of ₿ apart from ledger

Proof of work—validate ₿ transactions

- Must **protect validation from Sybil attacks**, so:
 - Make it computationally costly to incorporate new transactions
 - move to **how much computing power you control**, not just the number of identities that you control (*i.e.*, the basis of Sybil attacks)
 - Make it **rewarding to incorporate new transactions**—more later
- Validator collects transactions into a block
 - **checks transactions internally** first—could be double spending
 - **forms Merkle tree** over transaction hashes (see later slides...)
 - to close off the block, it **applies proof of work** algorithm

bitcoin transaction validation

- Proof of work must be **easy to check; hard to compute**
 - In some ways like a hard-to-apply digital signature
- bitcoin: must **find a nonce** that when appended to the block of transactions⁺ gives a **hash value less than target**
 - SHA-256 hash function used, specifically
 - Target is dynamic: ensures blocks take ~10 minutes to compute, regardless of changes in net computational resources available
- Mid-August 2023: bitcoin blockchain is about 504.38 GB


Blockchain approaches predate bitcoin

- Blockchain because new block **includes hash of previous block**
 - Thus records' integrity checks are linked together sequentially
- Linked hashes widely used before bitcoin (2008), e.g.:
 - Git (2005) **chains hashes** to preserve integrity of whole history
 - (Git's rebase operation can be disruptive: hashes get changed)
 - Solaris ZFS (2006) forms **trees of hashes** to confirm the integrity of stored files and folders
 - Let's explore Merkle trees in more detail...

Merkle tree: efficient integrity checking

- Consider a set of data blocks D_i , then:
 - A hash value is computed for each data block D_i
 - A tree is built, with **parent hash hashing hashes of its children**
 - The root hash will thus summarise all the data blocks
- Checking hash on particular D_i can be done cheaply
 - **Get trusted root hash**; other hashes can **come from anywhere**
 - Used within Bittorrent to check blocks retrieved build valid file
 - Also with ZFS, within bitcoin transaction blocks, *etc.*

Merkle tree depiction



- **Leaf data blocks** may be any size
- All **upper blocks** H_{xx} are fixed size
- Need good H_{top}
 - After that, H_{xx} **from untrusted sources** OK: still integrity-checked
- Secure implementation needs a few more details
 - e.g., H_{xx} blocks must not be able to be passed off as leaf data

Validators, mining, fees and the network

- Bitcoin **miners** are carrying out **validation of blocks**
- Two incentives for miners to solve block hash task:
 - **reward** of 6.25 bitcoin since May 2020; around NZ\$216,000 (ish)
 - value halves periodically; was 50฿ in 2009!
 - by 2140 CE no further bitcoin increase
 - **ability to levy fees**—commercial competition applies
- Broadcast communication between miners uses a peer-to-peer protocol
 - avoids central infrastructure... and knowing the miner set (!)

Results from block validation

- Rate is **~10 minutes**, but this is probabilistic
 - e.g., might guess an appropriate nonce first off (if really lucky)
- Automatically **helps serialisation**: variance in mining time is larger than the message broadcast time
 - Miners want to **publish results ASAP** so to receive payment
 - (Some potential attacks do involve holding back a solution.)
- Still **possible for multiple answers** to be broadcast, so...

Blockchain forks need to be resolved

- When **nodes hear multiple solutions** they keep them all
- Subsequent mining is only **done on your longest fork**
 - Extremely unlikely that parallel forks will continue for long
 - **Software bugs can cause long-lived forks**—have happened!
 - Probability distribution likely to clearly favour one branch
- Attacker with significant resources can try to keep fork alive, but cost, coordination and probability won't help
 - (Some attacks involve late revealing of privately mined forks.)

How/when is a transaction approved?

- Clearly the **transaction has to be recorded** in a block
- Two simple rules are applied:
 - Relevant block must be in the **longest fork of blockchain**
 - **Five or more blocks** must already follow it in the blockchain
- This causes a **transaction clearing delay** (in effect)
 - Consider possible attacks, e.g., partitioning of network
 - Probably impractically difficult to effect

Conclusion

- Failures can threaten security by **affecting availability**
 - Hardware and software problems
- Efficient means exist to reach **decentralised consensus**:
 - **Merkle trees** for checking integrity
 - **Apache ZooKeeper**, and **etcd**, within a known set
 - **Proof-of-work within permissionless blockchain** such as bitcoin
- Discussed at high level **blockchain & how bitcoin works**